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INFORMATION EVALUATION INA COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT:
CONTEXTAND TASKEFFECTS
ABSTRACT
This paper reports the results of an experiment in which subjects assumed
the role of division managers in a decentralized firm and made subjective
information system choices. Existing subjective information evaluation research
is extended by incorporating a two-person competitive environment and
investigating the effects of context and task variables on information system
choice. Consistent with previous studies, subjects' information system choices
indicated misperception of information values, with overvaluation of information
occurring more frequently than undervaluation. Deviations from predictions of a
game-theoretic model occurred under conditions of state uncertainty. Choices of
subjects playing a game with equivalent payoffs, but without state uncertainty,
conformed to the model, for the most part. In addition, context did not have an
aggregate effect on subjects' information system choices in the settings with state
uncertainty. However, alternative presentation modes for information system
costs had differing effects on choices across contexts.
iI
INFORMATION EVALUATION INA COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT:
CONTEXTAND TASKEFFECTS
Accountants often face the task of evaluating alternative systems for
generating "decision-facilitating" information, that is, information which is used
to help resolve uncertainty in a problem prior to making a decision [Demski and
Feltham, 1976, p. 9]. Accounting researchers have utilized the theory of
information economics to develop criteria for the evaluation of such information
systems. This theoretical framework assumes that individuals act consistently
with the expected utility hjrpothesis. Experimental research has shown, however,
that individuals' subjective evaluations of information systems are not always
consistent with the values calculated using information economics [Hilton,
Swieringa, and Hoskin, 1981; Hilton and Swieringa, 1981; Schepanski and
Uecker, 1983; Uecker, Schepanski, and Shin, 1985].
This paper examines the task of choosing a decision-facilitating
information system in a multi-person setting in which individual objectives are in
conflict. In the experiment reported here, subjects assumed the role of one of two
division managers in a decentralized firm. The subjects interacted with a micro-
computer, which played the role of the other manager.
Two features of the current paper distinguish it from previous research.
First, it addresses the problem of subjective information evaluation in a two-
person environment with conflicting individual objectives. Within such an
environment, a private information system may affect the actions of the person
without access to the system. Consequently, the value of information may differ
from that in a single-person setting or in a multi-person setting where individual
objectives are not in conflict Paiman, 1975]. Current analytical models utilized in
accounting research generally assume a multi-person environment with
conflicting objectives [Baiman, 1982; Demski and Kreps, 1982]. However,
experimental work in accounting has focused on single-person settings [Demski
and Swieringa, 1980; Swieringa and Weick, 1982]. In particular, it is not known
whether individuals consider strategic implications when deciding whether or
not to choose a given information system.
Second, this paper investigates the effect of context and task characteristics
on information evaluation behavior. Existing subjective information evaluation
research has exclusively incorporated variables directly related to the economic
demand value of information. However, the contexts in which information
system evaluation problems are encountered often differ. Also, task characteris-
tics, such as the manner in which the payoffs and costs associated with a system
are presented, may vary. Results reported in recent studies of other decision
problems involving uncertainty [Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981; Payne, 1982] suggest
that subjective evaluations of information systems may be subject to context and
task effects. These effects may occur instead of, or in addition to, the effects of the
variables that enter into the calculation of the demand value of information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, the relationship
of context and task variables to the information evaluation problem is discussed.
Second, the experimental method and hypotheses are described. The third section
presents the experimental results. The final section of the paper is a discussion of
the results and conclusions.
Theoretical Development
Schepanski and Uecker [1983] and Uecker, Schepanski, and Shin [1985]
found that individuals consistently ascribed positive value to information systems,
even when the economic demand value of these systems was zero. This research
suggests that individuals may perceive the value of information as positive, even
when it is not. However, other evidence on whether overvaluation is a general
tendency is not clear. Hilton and Swieringa [1982] also found their subjects
consistently overvalued information. On the other hand, Hilton, Swieringa, and
Hoskin [1982] used a similar elicitation technique and reported that only a portion
of their subjects overvalued information.
Inconsistencies between subjective valuations of information systems and
their theoreticsd values may depend on context and/or task variables. Context
effects in decision making research are synonjrmous with content , especially as it
relates to the perceived values of the objects in a decision set under consideration
[Payne, 1982, p. 386]. The context variable in this study is manipulated by making
slight wording changes in an information evaluation problem, while maintaining
the same basic problem structure. Task effects are associated with the formal
structure of a decision problem. The task variable examined here is the
presentation mode for information system costs. Information systems are either
presented as "costly" (system costs shown as a separate item) or "costless"
(system costs netted out of expected values).
Context Effects
Economic information evaluation models presume that responses should be
consistent for problems with identical structures, regardless of the content or
framing of the problems. Behavioral researchers assert, however, that content
gives meaning to tasks and should not be ignored in trying to predict behavior
[Einhorn and Hogarth, 1980, p.61]. Indeed, context effects arising from slight
wording changes have been demonstrated in a number of problems involving
decision making under uncertainty, such as gambles for money, medical
decisions about saving lives, and decisions whether or not to purchase insurance
[Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Hershey and
Schoemaker, 1980; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1982]. Since information
evaluation is basically a decision to employ a system that will reduce or eliminate
uncertainty, it may be subject to similar effects. There are two alternative
premises tested in this study with respect to context.
The first premise is that individuals will overvalue information when
presented with an explicit information acquisition decision, but not when the
problem is presented in more general terms, e.g., as an opportunity to reduce
uncertainty. This prediction is based upon the context effects in insurance
purchase decisions observed by Hershey and Schoemaker [1980]. In this study,
individuals responded differently when a problem was framed as a choice
between a sure loss and a lottery with a loss component than when it was framed
as a decision to pay an insurance premium to protect against loss. Given the
same set of values in both problems, the majority of subjects chose the risky
prospect in the gambling problem, while the majority decided to pay the premium
in the insurance problem. One of the reasons given for this result is content
affects the way individuals view the problems, even though their structure is the
same. The insurance purchase may be viewed as the purchase of protection (a
valuable good), while the gamble in the lottery context is viewed as preferable to a
certain loss [Einhom and Hogarth, 1980; Slovic, et al., 1982]. A similar context
effect may occur in information evaluation problems. Individuals may view
information as a valuable good when presented with an information evaluation
context, but not in a generalized uncertainty reduction context. This effect may
lead to information overvaluation in the first case, and evaluations consistent
with economic models in the second.
The alternative premise is that individuals will overvalue information,
regardless of context. This is supported by the notion that persons are
uncomfortable with uncertain outcomes, thus finding the reduction or omission
of uncertainty a useful cognitive simplification mechanism [Hogarth, 1975, p.273].
Any mechanism that is thought to reduce uncertainty may be perceived as
valuable, even though it may have no effect on final outcomes [Langer, 1977;
Feldman and March, 1981].
TaskEfifects
The subjective information evaluation research discussed at the beginning
of this section focused upon elicitation of demand values. That is, experimenters
determined the stated cost at which subjects would be indifferent between a given
information system and no information. Within an organization, however, the
stated cost of an information system to a user may or may not equal its expected
value, or even the actual cost of implementing the system. For example, the costs
of producing certain reports may be borne entirely by a data processing
department within an organization. Alternatively, each division may be entirely
responsible for its own information production costs. ^
To give a simple example of a stated cost manipulation, consider the
following problems (table values are outcomes; utility is linear):
Problem A
si (p=0.6) s2 (p=0.4) EU
al 100 -25 50
a2 -25 25 -5
Problem B
si (p=0.6) s2 (p=0.4) EU
al 100 -25 50
a2 -25 50 5
Assume that perfect information on the state outcome is costless in Problem A
and is available for 10 units in Problem B. This allows one to choose ai contingent
on si and a2 contingent on S2, yielding an expected utility of 70. Therefore, the
expected utility of perfect information is 10 units for both cases, indicating one
should choose to act with information in both even though the stated cost of
information is different . 2
However, individuals may focus on stated cost in ways which are
irrelevant, according to economic models [Aschenbrenner, 1978; Payne, 1982,
p. 390]. They may use stated cost as an evaluation criterion within a simplified
decision process, in lieu of expected value. Individuals following such an
approach would set an arbitrary stated cost cutoff point beyond which they will not
utilize information, regardless of its expected value. In the above case, assume
that a person sets 5 units as their cutoff point. Then, they will act with
information in Problem A, but undervalue information in Problem B. One can
also construct examples in which this type of decision rule will lead to the
overvaluation of information.
A second possibility is that stated cost may affect the decision strategies
used to evaluate information systems. When a system is costless or has low stated
cost, an individual may decide that expending cognitive resources on detailed
analysis of the benefits of the system is not warranted. When stated costs are
high, one may make the effort to do an expected value analysis to avoid
expenditures on the "wrong" information system. This prediction is derived from
a cost-benefit framework for decision strategy selection [Beach and Mitchell,
1978]. Within this framework, stated cost would be viewed as a decision
environment characteristic which, in turn, affects task demand , i.e., the
perceived need to use analytic decision strategies.^
Interaction Between Context and Task Effects
The above discussion of context effects predicts they will occur, regardless
of the stated cost of information. This analysis assumes that context effects occur
because the wording of the problem affects one's overall perceptions of value in the
choice set under consideration. On the other hand, these effects may occur
because context changes the way costs are framed [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Slovic, et al, 1982]. If the latter proposition is true, then context effects will occur
only when the stated cost of information is positive. For example, positive stated
cost information may be overvalued in the information evaluation setting, and
evaluated according to the economic model or undervalued in the other setting.
This is consistent with individuals viewing the cost of information as a payment
for obtaining a valuable good in the information evaluation context and as a loss
in the uncertainty reduction context. At the same time, information with zero
stated cost would be evaluated consistently across contexts.
Method
Experimental Setting
The setting of the experiment is a firm which produces a single product.
The firm has two divisions, each headed by a single manager (Manager A and
Manager B). (See Appendix A.) The firm's output and the payoffs to the
managers depend jointly on the actions of the managers and the outcome of a
random state of nature. Each manager has a choice of one of two actions and
there are two possible states of nature. Both managers are aware of each other's
payoffs and preferences. Manager A has the opportunity to utilize an information
system which generates perfect information on the state outcome (11^).
Alternatively, he may choose to act without an information system (i.e., "use" the
null information system (t|0).4 Manager B knows Manager A's information
system choice.
In a game-theoretic analysis of the problem, Manager A must make two
decisions. First, he must choose between two subgames, one in which he has
private information on the state outcome and the other in which he does not.
Once he has chosen a subgame, he must choose an action (if acting without
information) or a decision rule, which specifies actions to be taken contingent on
state outcomes (if acting with information). It can be shown, depending on the
payoff sets of both managers, that Manager A's payoff at the Nash
8equilibrium (NE) point in the private information subgame can be greater than,
equal to, or less than that at the NE point in the no information subgame (See
Appendix B.). That is, private information can have have positive, zero, or
negative expected value for Manager A. This result is in contrast to a single-
person or decision-theoretic setting, in which the Fineness Corollary of
Blackwell's Theorem states that the value of a finer information system is always
greater than or equal to that of a coarser one [Baiman, 1975]. The result is
counterintuitive, but the following example illustrates illustrates how the value of
information might be negative.
Assimie the following scenario: Each manager is responsible for one stage
of the production process for a precision tool, with one in charge of the casting
department and the other responsible for the machining department. The two
actions available to each manager represent high and low levels of effort, while
the random parameter represents the quality of the raw materials used in the
process. When neither manager has private information, the best strategy for
both is to expend a high level of effort. When Manager A has private information,
he is able to adjust his effort level contingent on the state outcome. At the same
time, the payoffs are such that it is no longer optimal for Manager B to expend a
high effort level. This affects the firm's total output and, in turn, lowers Manager
As expected payoff. 5» 6
Experimental Design
In the experiment, CONTEXT was a between-subjects variable with three
levels and COST was a within-subjects variable with two levels. COST was
mginipulated within subjects in order to investigate whether subjects attended to it
as a decision cue, as discussed above. CONTEXT was a between-subjects variable,
since changes in problem wording in the course of an experiment might lead
subjects to (1) view all presentations of the problem as equivalent, inhibiting
framing effects, or (2) speculate on the part of subjects as to the intentions of the
experimenter, causing order effects with no clear theoretical interpretation
[Keren gmd Raaijmakers, 1988]. Additionally, the expected value of information
(EV) was a within-subjects variable. Levels of COST were zero and positive (0 and
10 units) in the experimental cases. EV levels were negative, zero, and positive (-
10, 0, and +10 units). "^ Each of the six resulting cases was repeated five times
before the subject was presented with another case, resulting in a total of 30
experimental trials.
All cases with the same stated cost of information were presented together.
Order of presentation with respect to stated cost (ORDER) was treated as a
between-subjects variable and counterbalanced. The order of presentation with
respect to expected value within each level of stated cost was randomized. Ten
subjects were presented with each combination of CONTEXT and ORDER,
resulting in a total of 60 subjects in the design. (See Figure 1.)
Insert Figure 1 about here;
Experimental Variables
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the experiment is the proportion of times over a
set of game trials a subject chooses the private information subgame for a given
case. Since "Manager A" is the only individual in the experimental scenario able
to make such choices, all subjects assumed this role. The role of "Manager B"
was taken by the computer. The computer was programmed to play its NE
strategies in each subgame, in order to minimize the possibility that subjects
playing non-Nash strategies might confound the results.
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Independent Variables: CONTEXT and COST
Two different contexts incorporating state uncertainty were used in the
experiment. The first context was an information evaluation problem. The
parameters (e.g., payoffs and probabilities) in the second context were exactly the
same as in the first, except that the problem of information evaluation was
presented as a choice between two production processes. One process allowed the
manager to make decisions contingent on the observed state of nature, while the
other did not. These two contexts will be referred to as the information evaluation
and process choice contexts. In the first of these contexts, the stated cost of
information (COST) was labelled as such. In the second, it was presented as an
additional fixed cost associated with the process allowing contingent choices. (See
Appendix A.)
A setting without state uncertainty was also used in the experiment. In
this setting, subjects chose a subgame (labelled a "production process") and an
action to be taken within the subgame. Payoffs for each outcome in the subgames
were the expected values of the outcomes for the settings with state uncertainty.
The dependent variable for this setting is the proportion of times over a set of game
trials a subject chooses the subgame corresponding to private information in the
other settings. This setting will be referred to as the basic ^ame .^
The basic game was incorporated into the experiment in order to determine
whether individuals playing under conditions of certainty would choose optimal
strategies, as defined within a Nash solution framework (See Appendix B.). The
basic game therefore serves as a "baseline" against which the settings with state
uncertainty can be compared. If optimal subgame choices are observed in the
basic game setting, but non-optimal choices are observed in the settings with state
uncertainty, one can infer that the non-optimal choices occurred due to the
cognitive simplification mechanisms and/or framing effects discussed earlier. If
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non-optimal subgame choices occur in all settings, additional work is needed to
determine: (1) why the deviations from optimality occurred and (2) if the
deviations occurred for the same reason in the settings with and without state
uncertainty.
Independent Variables: EV
EV was treated as a within-subjects variable, in order to have a basis for
testing differences in choice proportions across different levels. These tests
provide an indication whether the subjects perceived that the expected value of
private information (in the settings with state uncertainty) or the relationship
between the NE payoffs for the two subgames (in the basic game setting) differs
across cases. Planned comparisons are employed to indicate if these differences
(or lack of differences) are affected by context and stated cost.
Since the EV variable has three levels, a set of two orthogonal contrasts can
be performed on it. The comparison of primary interest is that between observed
values of the dependent variable for positive and negative EV levels. It can be
written as:
03
-ai (1)
where: ak denotes the proportion of times subjects choose to play the
private information subgame for cases with EV k
and: k = 1, 2, and 3 denote negative, zero, and positive levels of EV.
For the settings with state uncertainty, this comparison indicates whether
subjects perceive the value of information in the positive EV case to be greater
than that in the negative EV case, or the same. Interactions between other
independent variables and this comparison indicate whether or not these
variables have an effect on perceived differences in information value.
The second possible contrast in this set is that between zero EV and the
mean of positive and negative EV, or:
12
a2-(ai + fl3)/2 (2)
Given that the value of the first contrast is significantly greater than zero, this
contrast gives an indication in the settings with state uncertainty whether the
perceived differences between the three levels of information value are equal. If
these differences are equal, then the value of the second contrast will not be
significantly different from zero. If, however, the difference in choice proportions
between zero and positive EV levels is smaller than that between zero and
negative EV, the second contrast will be positive. In the remainder of the paper,
contrasts of the type specified by Equation 1 will be referred to as EV(1) and those
of the type specified by Equation 2 will be referred to as EV(2).
Hypotheses
The basic game setting is used in this study as a "baseline" against which
results in the settings with state uncertainty are compared. Therefore, the
hypotheses presented below are all based upon predicted interactions of
CONTEXT with COST and EV. The hypotheses are grouped together by
interaction term in the following discussion.
CONTEXT X COST
COST should only affect subjects' behavior in the settings with state
uncertainty. It should have no effect in the basic game setting.
Hi: The private information subgame choice proportion does not differ
across COST levels in the basic game setting, while in the settings
with state uncertainty, the choice proportion is greater for zero than
for positive COST cases.
CONTEXT X EV
This interaction is an indicator whether misperceptions of information
value have occurred in one or both settings with state imcertainty. Misperception
of information value is indicated if the contrast between negative and positive EV
levels (the 'EV(l)' contrast) for a setting with state uncertainty is significantly
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smaller than that for the basic game. The CONTEXT x EV(1) interaction may
take one of two forms, depending on which of the premises regarding the effect of
problem wording presented above is true. If information evaluation behavior is
affected by problem wording, then only the EV(1) contrast for the information
evaluation setting should be significantly smaller than that for the basic game.
On the other hand, if the misperception of information value occurs consistently,
regardless of problem wording, the EV(1) contrasts for both settings with state
uncertainty should both be significantly smaller than for the basic game setting.
H2A- Th© EV(1) contrast is smaller in the information evaluation setting
than in the basic game.
H2B' The EV(1) contrast is smaller in both the process choice and
information evaluation settings than in the basic game.
Rejection of the null for either of these hypotheses indicates either
overvaluation and/or undervaluation of information occurred. Therefore, if the
null of H2A or H2B is rejected, either H3A or H3B will be tested. However, it is
predicted, based on the discussion in the theoretical development section, that
significant results will only be found for overvaluation.
Hsa: The private information subgame choice proportion at the negative
(positive) EV level is greater (less) in the information evaluation
setting than in the basic game.
H3B: The private information subgame choice proportion at the negative
(positive) EV level is greater (less) in both the process choice and
information evaluation settings than in the basic game.
Another type of CONTEXT x EV interaction concerns the relationship
between choice proportions for zero and the other EV levels. It is predicted that
subjects in the basic game setting will not exhibit a clear preference for either
subgame in the cases representing zero EV levels. This results in an EV(2)
contrast which is equal or nearly equal to zero. On the other hand, the subjects in
either of the settings with state uncertainty may prefer to act with information
14
when it has zero EV, even though in economic terms, they should be indifferent
between information and no information at this point. This behavior results in a
positive EV(2) contrast, given the EV(1) contrast is in the predicted direction.
H4: The EV(2) contrast is not significantly different from zero in the
basic game, while it is greater than zero in the settings with state
uncertainty.
CONTEXT X COST x EV
COST may affect the perceived differences between positive and negative
levels of EV, causing them to be greater for positive than for zero stated cost
information. This would lead to a COST x EV(1) interaction. However, this effect
should not occur without a related CONTEXT x COST x EV(1) interaction, since
COST should not have an effect on perceived differences between levels of EV in
the basic game setting.
H5A: The EV(1) contrast will be greater for positive than for zero COST
cases in the settings with state uncertainty, but not in the basic
game setting.
Alternatively, the COST x EV(1) interaction may differ across state
uncertainty contexts. As discussed earlier, subjects may view the cost of
information as a loss in the process choice context, but as payment for a valuable
good in the information evaluation context. If this occurs, the perceived
difference between positive and negative levels ofEV will be affected by cost only in
the process choice context.
H5B: The EV(1) contrast will be greater for positive than for zero COST cases
only in the process choice context.
A CONTEXT X COST x EV(2) interaction may arise as follows: Suppose
that subjects do. act consistently with the expected utility hypothesis when
evaluating information at the positive and negative EV levels. Also, they are
indifferent as to information choice for zero EV cases with zero COST. However, a
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cost framing effect occurs at the zero EV level. For positive COST cases, the
majority of subjects prefer information in the information evaluation setting and
the majority prefer to act without it in the process choice setting. (See Figure 2.)
Such an effect is consistent with a shift in reference point due to framing, as
described in prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 198 1].^ In this example, the reference point is the status quo in an
uncertainty reduction context, while it is one's position after purchasing the
information in the information evaluation context.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
H6a: The EV(2) contrast is greater for positive than for zero COST cases in
the information evaluation setting.
Hqb: The EV(2) contrast is smaller for positive than for zero COST cases in
the process choice setting.
Sutgects and Procedure
The subjects were students at the University of Texas at Austin. Twenty-
one were fourth-year students in the Progrsim in Professional Accounting (PPA),
34 were MBA students, and 5 were first-year accounting Ph.D. students. Subjects
were assigned to experimental groups so that the proportion of each type of
student was approximately equal in each group. The experiment was run in a
computer lab using IBM PCs. There were six separate experimental sessions,
with from 6 to 16 subjects completing the experiment at any one time. Subjects
participating in the same session were randomly assigned to different
experimental treatments.
The experiment was conducted in four phases: (1) preliminary
instructions, (2) a quiz on the instructions, (3) practice trials, and (4) the main
part of the experiment. At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects
were given a set of instructions consistent with their experimental condition and
16
assigned to a computer. The computer displayed the game values and expected
values (in the settings with state uncertainty) for the practice trials. Subjects
were instructed to read the instructions and examine the computer display, but
not to proceed with the experiment.
When all subjects were set up at their computers, the experimenter
provided additional brief oral instructions on the use of the IBM keyboard and the
conduct of the experiment. The subjects were informed they would be paid in
cash at the end of the session and reminded they would be eligible for further
prizes, based on their performance. They were instructed to ask any necessary
questions during the quiz or practice trials, since no questions were allowed
during the main part of the experiment. The subjects were then told to finish
reading the instructions and proceed with the experiment when ready.
The quiz consisted of questions designed to test subjects' ability to correctly
read the payoff matrices. Each subject completed five practice trials with EV of
and COST of 5. After the practice trigds, the subjects' point endowment was reset
to 100 points and they played the thirty actual trials.
During each trial, the computer prompted the subject for two responses:
(1) an information (in the information evaluation setting) or process choice (in the
basic game and process choice settings) and (2) an action or production plan
choice. In the basic game setting, the computer's ("Manager B's") action and
the payoffs to the subject and computer were revealed after the subject's response.
In the other settings, a random number representing the state outcome was
drawn and revealed to the subject immediately if he chose to act with
information. The computer's action and the payoffs to the subject and computer
were then revealed. In cases where the subject chose to act without information,
the computer's action was revealed first, then the random number, and finally
the payoffs. A message on the computer screen notified the subject when payoffs
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or the stated cost of information were to change on the next trial. After adl the
experimental trials were completed, the experimenter verified the subjects' point
totals and paid them in cash.
Subject payoffs for each trial were stated in points. The conversion rate
from points to cash was 1 point = 1 cent. Subjects began the experiment with an
initial endowment of 100 points, £ind accumulated further payoffs on each of the 30
experimental trials. The expected value (or in the basic game setting, the payofD
from making the optimal subgame and action choices for all 30 trials was $16.00.
Combined with the initial endowment, this made the expected value for the entire
experiment $17.00.12
Differences in individual risk preferences were controlled for by designing
the experiment so that the ordinal relationship of the expected values for each
strategy combination is maintained under a wide variety of positive monotonic
transformations of the matrix values. The results can only be affected by risk
attitude in the case where subjects are extremely risk-averse or risk-seeking.
Such risk attitudes are unlikely to occur, given the range of payoffs from the
experiment. Not only do the predictions of the game theory model hold under a
wide range of preferences for both players, but they will also hold under a variety
of individual beliefs about those preferences. The payoffs for the experiment were
also designed so that the predictions of prospect theory would hold, as long as the
general form of subjects' value functions remains consistent with prospect theory
(risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses). Therefore, shifts in the value
functions postulated by prospect theory should not cause inconsistencies in
subject responses during the experiment. ^3
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Results
Main Effects
Table 1 is a sumraary of the proportions with which the subjects chose the
private information subgame, broken down by the four independent variables.
Table 2 presents the results of the repeated measures MANOVA of the data.l"*' ^^
The only significant main effects are those for COST (p = 0.004) and EV (p < 0.001).
The dependent variable proportion for the zero COST level is greater for that for
positive COST (azero COST = 0-75; apos. COST = 0.67). The EV(1) contrast is
significantly greater than zero (sLpos. EV ~ flneg. EV = 0-^^ ~ 0.50 = 0.36; p < 0.001), as
is the EV(2) contrast (Ozero EV - (flneg. EV + flpos. Ev) / 2 = 0.08; p = 0.014).
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.
Hypothesized InteractioDS
The CONTEXT x COST, CONTEXT x EV, and CONTEXT x COST x EV
interactions all were statistically significant (p = 0.061, p < 0.001, andp = 0.033,
respectively). Table 3 displays the results of tests of individual hypotheses. All
these tests were performed using the Dunn-Sid^k multiple comparison procedure
[Kirk, 1982, pp. 110-111; Games, 1977].
Insert Table 3 about here.
CONTEXT x COST : The effect of COST was not significant in the basic
game and significant (p = 0.003) in the information evaluation setting, as
predicted by Hi. However, no significant effect was found in the process choice
setting, contrary to Hi (See Figure 3.).
Insert Figure 3 about here.
CONTEXT X EV : Only the EV(1) component of this interaction is
statistically significant (p < 0.001). Values of the EV(1) contrast are 0.71, 0.16, and
0.22, for the basic game, process choice, and information evaluation settings,
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respectively (See Figure 4.). The absence of a CONTEXT x EV(2) interaction
indicates the EV(2) contrast was consistently positive across contexts, including
the basic game setting.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
The EV(1) contrasts for both the information evaluation and process choice
settings are both significantly smaller than for the basic game setting (p < 0.000),
supporting H2b- ^^ addition, there was no significant difference in EV(1)
contrasts between the information evaluation and process choice settings. Tests
for overvaluation of negative EV information were significant (p < 0.001) for both
settings with state uncertainty, and tests for undervaluation of positive EV
information were significant atp = 0.014 andp = 0.028 for the process choice and
information evaluation settings, supporting H3B. The absolute values of the
contrasts for overvaluation tests were larger than for undervaluation tests.
CONTEXT X COST x EV : The COST x EV(1) contrast for a given context is
computed as the EV(1) contrast for positive stated cost cases minus the EV(1)
contrast for zero cost cases. Therefore, H5A and H5B predict positive values for the
COST X EV(1) contrast in the settings with state uncertainty. Values of the COST
X EV(1) contrasts are 0.10, -0.25, and 0.08 for the basic game, process choice, and
information evaluation settings, respectively. Of these, only the contrast for the
process choice setting is significantly different from zero (p < 0.047). However,
the contrast is negative. These results support neither H5A nor H5B.
The COST x EV(2) contrasts were computed using a similar formula. They
are 0.11, -0.19, and -0.07 for the basic game, process choice, and information
evaluation settings. Only the contrast for the process choice setting is
significantly different from zero (p < 0.10). Again, it is opposite the predicted
direction and supports neither HgA nor HeB-
I
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Figure 5 shows that COST apparently had a negligible effect on the
dependent variable for all levels of EV in the basic game and a consistent effect for
all levels of EV in the information evaluation setting. In the process choice
setting, choice proportions were nearly equal across EV levels for positive COST
cases. For zero COST cases, differences between negative and zero EV levels
were observed, but not between zero £ind positive EV levels.
Insert Figure 5 about here.
Interactions withORDER
In addition to the predicted interactions, two interactions involving the
ORDER variable were significant, ORDER x COST (p = 0.026) and ORDER x
CONTEXT X COST x EV (p = 0.027). The significant (p = 0.007) EV(linear)
component of the second of these interactions indicates learning effects may have
occurred. If learning is taking place, the difference in choice proportions between
negative and positive EV cases will be greater in the second half of the experiment
than in the first, regardless of ORDER. This leads to an interaction between
COST, ORDER, and the hnear component of EV.
Further investigation of this interaction showed that the difference in
choice proportions between negative and positive EV cases was greater in the
second half of the experiment than in the first in the basic game and information
evaluation settings, but not in the process choice setting. The difference from the
first to the last half of the experiment was statistically significant (p = 0.02) only
in the basic game setting. Inspection of the data for the basic game setting (See
Table 1.) shows that for all cases with positive EV, the observed choice proportion a
was at or near 1.0, regardless of COST or the order of case presentation. However,
in the zero cost first order, a was 0.54 for negative EV/zero COST cases (those
presented first), while fl decreased to 0.08 for negative EV/positive COST cases
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(those presented last). A similar, but weaker effect occurred in the positive cost
first order, where SL was 0.32 for negative EV/positive COST cases and 0.14 for
negative EV/zero COST cases.
Individual Choice Patterns
An analysis was made of individual choice patterns in order to determine
whether they were consistent with the CONTEXT x EV interaction found in the
aggregate data. This analysis is broken down by CONTEXT and COST (See
Table 4.)A^ Payoff maximization was the most common pattern in the basic game
setting. On the other hand, consistently acting with information was the most
common pattern in the settings with state uncertainty. ^'^ When behavior across
both COST levels is considered, no subjects in the process choice setting
consistently acted as expected payoff maximizers through the entire experiment,
and only one subject did so in the information evaluation setting. In contrast,
seven subjects in the basic game consistently made choices consistent with payoff
maximization throughout the entire experiment. Additionally, three subjects in
settings with state uncertainty consistently acted without information—two acted
as such only when stated cost was positive and one did so for both levels of stated
cost.
Insert Table 4 about here.
To further investigate the CONTEXT x COST x EV interaction, an analysis
of individual shifts in choice proportions across COST levels was also made. This
was done by performing a separate Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test for
each level of EV within each CONTEXT, using response proportions for each
COST level as the dependent variable. None of the comparisons for the basic game
or process choice settings were statistically significant. However, the
comparisons for all levels of EV within the information evaluation setting were all
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statistically significant in the expected direction for negative, zero, and positive
EV levels (p = 0.04, p = 0.01, p = 0.02).
Action Choice Data
The analysis thus far has focused on subgame choice. Yet, as discussed
earlier, one must evaluate the payoff associated with the optimaJ action within
each subgame (i.e., evaluate the optimal payoffs for acting with and without
information) before choosing a subgame (i.e., information system choice) based on
that evaluation. It is possible that some of the results presented here occurred
because subjects chose the wrong actions in the first phase of the evaluation
process. However, dominant actions were chosen 95% of the time in the entire
experiment, regardless of subgame choice. This result indicates that subjects in
the settings with state uncertainty acted consistently with the Nash solution
concept concerning action choices, even though they appeared to ignore strategic
considerations when making information svstem choices.
Slight differences were noted in the proportion of dominant action choices
within each CONTEXT (proportions were 0.94, 0.97, and 0.95 for the basic game,
process choice, and information evaluation settings), but the differences were not
statistically significant. Note also that the proportions of dominant action choices
were lowest in the basic game setting, even though the highest proportion of
optimal subgame choices occurred here.
Discussion and Conclusions
Context andTask Effects on Information Evaluation
The choices of subjects in both settings with state uncertainty were
relatively imaffected by information EV, compared to the "benchmark" of subjects
playing under conditions of certainty. Further analysis of choice data indicated
this effect occurred primarily because of overvaluation of information with
negative EV in both settings with state uncertainty. Undervaluation of
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information with positive EV was also indicated, but to a lesser extent than
overvaluation. Analysis of individual choice data confirmed that overvaluation of
information occurred frequently at the individual level in both settings with state
uncertainty, although three individuals demonstrated undervaluation. These
findings are consistent with previous subjective information studies in
accounting, as well as in other areas [Connolly and Gilani, 1982; Connolly and
Serre, 1984]. They also consistent with empirical observations which indicate that
both over- and underacquisition of information routinely occurs in organizations
[Feldman and March, 1981].
The COST task manipulation had no significant effect on behavior in the
basic game setting, but did affect behavior in the settings with state uncertainty.
These effects differed across the two state uncertainty settings. Within the
information evaluation setting, both aggregate and individual analyses showed
the effects of COST were in the predicted direction and consistent across EV
levels. Consequently, it appears that subjects in this setting attended to COST as
a decision cue. In the process choice setting, there was virtually no difference in
information choice proportions across EV levels for positive COST cases, while a
difference occurred for zero COST cases. At the negative EV level, the choice
proportion for positive COST cases was greater than that for zero COST. 18
Analysis of within-subjects choice shifts, however, did not indicate that COST had
an effect on individual subject decisions in this setting.
The differing effects of COST across contexts indicate that researchers
need to consider context and task variables when designing information
evaluation experiments, since the results obtained with one set of variables may
not be readily generalizable to others. These effects also have potential
implications for those who design and implement information systems for use in
organizations. The manner in which a given system and the costs associated
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with it are presented may cause individuals' subjective evaluations of the system
to vary.
Decision Strategies for Information System Choice
A number of subjects in the settings with state uncertainty consistently
chose to act with information, regardless of the game parameters. This behavior
was not affected by learning from the first to the second half of the experiment.
These results suggest that subjects in the state uncertainty settings frequently
utilized an "act with information" decision strategy.
One possible explanation for the "act with information" strategy is based on
the cost-benefit framework [Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Christensen-Szalanski,
1978, 1980] discussed earlier. That is, subjects consciously decided the costs of
implementing complex decision strategies outweighed the benefits to be gained
from their use [Payne, 1982, p. 383]. A second explanation is that acting with
information is a metarule or metaheuristic . which is used to generate lower-level
strategies [Einhom, 1980, p.4]. Kleinmuntz and Thomas [1987] propose that
decision makers may employ metaheuristics as an alternative to calculative
rationality in choosing strategies for specific tasks. They describe the use of an
infer-then-act metarule, which is consistent with the use of uncertainty avoidance
mechanisms discussed in the second section of the paper. It is not yet known
which factors affect the use of metaheuristics. They may be "hard-wired", that is,
individuals may have a repertoire of metarules which are automatically called
upon when facing certain task situations. Otherwise, their use may be subject to
a simplified choice process, in which the input includes decision cues such as
context.
Extensions of this study which incorporate concurrent protocols can
indicate whether individuals consciously select simplified decision strategies
[Payne, 1982, p. 397]. They also would show how and when they incorporate stated
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information cost into their decision making processes. Finally, they would
provide evidence as to individuals' awareness of the importance of the other
player's actions in determining their own payoffs.
Information Evaluation and Strategic Behavior
As stated in the introduction, a factor which differentiates the present study
from previous work is that it was conducted in a multi-person environment, with
conflicting individual objectives. An important aspect of the results is that
subjects presented with a game with no state uncertainty conformed more closely
to the predictions of the Nash model than those playing a game with state
uncertainty and equivalent payoffs. This occurred even though controls for
differing risk attitudes were incorporated into the experiment.
However, behavior in the basic game setting was not entirely consistent
with that predicted by the Nash model. The overall proportion of choices of the
"information" subgame in the basic game setting in the "negative EV" case was
0.27, rather than zero. Further analysis of the data indicated learning effects in
the basic game, which were not observed in the settings with state uncertainty.
The results suggest that in the basic game, subjects may have started out with the
belief that their opponent would choose actions at random, rather than in any
strategic fashion. Once they were able to observe how their opponent played, they
shifted their own strategies to maximize their payoffs, given this new knowledge.
The learning behavior observed in the basic game may have been induced
by factors associated with this particular experiment. These include the fact the
subjects knew they were playing against a computer, as well as the wording of the
experiment instructions, which emphasized the fact the subject's opponent
makes choices without knowledge of the subject's actions. Either or both of these
factors could lead subjects to believe "Manager B's" choices occurred at random.
An alternative explanation is that inferring predicted actions through experience
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commonly occurs in strategic settings. This implies a weaker set of behavioral
assvimptions than those used in the Nash solution concept, which presumes that
all players are able to simultaneously infer each others' optimal strategies
[Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984; Tan and Werlang, 1986]. Investigation of strategic
behavior under alternative sets of assumptions is a fruitful area for future
analytical and experimental research.
The finding that subjects in the settings with state uncertainty were, for the
most part, unable to discern the strategic implications of subgame (i.e.,
information system) choice suggests the presence of uncertainty is an important
task variable in competitive settings, from a behavioral point of view. However,
exactly how and why uncertainty affected subjects' decisions is not clear. Also,
the findings of this study do not indicate that deviations firom economic rationality
will always occur in competitive settings with state uncertainty. Here, contextual
manipulations did not affect the extent to which subjects facing uncertainty acted
consistently with an economic model. However, other situations exist in which
individuals do use information in a strategic fashion [Ponssard, 1981, pp. 96-100].
Demski and Swieringa [1980] have speculated about the importance of
framing in multi-person settings, raising questions about: (1) whether framing
and choice processes differ when nature alone and/or choices of other individuals
affect the perceived outcomes, and (2) whether behavior in two competitive
settings with identical structure, but varying contexts, is dissimilar. The present
study has confirmed these speculations to a limited extent, showing that some of
the same framing effects and decision strategies that occur in single-person
settings also occur in a two-person setting. Additionally, it has shown that the
presence of state uncertainty has a significant effect on individual choice
behavior. However, further research is necessary to determine which context and
task features cause individuals to ignore the strategic implications of actions
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within a multi-person environment in some cases and act as if they were aware of
these implications in others.
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APPENDIXA
Excerpts from Instructions to Sulijects
The instructions below are for the settings with state uncertainty. Places
where the wording differs according to context are indicated with brackets, [ ],
with the wording for the process choice setting shown first and the information
evaluation setting shown second.
This is an experiment in management decision making. You will play the
role of a division manager in a company ("Manager A"). There is one other
division manager in the company ("Manager B"). The role of the other manager
will be played by the computer. It will be programmed to act as if it were a human
subject. You and Manager B will receive payoffs during each period of the
experiment. You cannot by yourself control these payoffs. Rather, payoffs to you
and Manager B will depend on the actions taken by both of you and on a random
outcome.
The payoffs are stated in points. The points are convertible into cash at the
end of the experiment at the rate of 100 points = 1 dollar. You will be credited with
100 points, or 1 dollar at the beginning of the experiment and payoffs or losses
from each period will be added or subtracted from your account at the end of each
period. The experiment will last a large number of periods, so you have the
opportunity to earn a significant amount in addition to your initial stake. If your
accumulated balance becomes negative at any time, continue to play, as there will
likely be enough periods remaining to accumulate a positive balance again.
The sequence of events during each period is:
1. You and Manager B will be presented with a display of outcome payoffs
and expected payoffs similar to the one currently on the screen.
2. You will choose [a production processi [whether or not to obtain
information on the random outcome].
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3. Manager B will be notified [of your choice of production process] [whether
or not you have decided to obtain information].
4. You will choose:
—a production action , if you have chosen [Process X] [to act without
information]
or
~a production plan , if you have chosen [Process Y] [to act with information]
and Manager B will choose a production action . Manager B will not know
which production action or plan you have chosen at the time he makes his choice.
5. The computer's random number generator will generate a number
between 1 and 100. If the number is from 1 to 60, Outcome 1 has occurred. If the
number is from 61 to 100, Outcome 2 has occurred. The random number and
outcome will be revealed to you at this point is you have chosen [Process Y] [to act
with information]. Note that Manager B alwavs chooses his action without
knowledge of the random number or outcome.
6. The following will then be revealed to both you and Manager B:
a. Manager B's production action. (Your production action is revealed to
Manager B at this point.)
b. The random number and outcome which occurred (if you chose [Process
X] [to act without information]).
c. Your and Manager B's payoffs and losses.
7. Your payoff (loss) for the trial will be added (subtracted) from your
accumulated point total.
. .
. . .The lower part of the EXPECTED PAYOFFS section shows the expected
payoffs for each combination of your production plan and Manager B's action
choice if you [choose Process Y] [elect to obtain information on the random
outcome]. A production plan specifies which actions will be taken, depending on
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the realized outcome. Note that the first two production plans specify that the
same action will be taken regardless of the outcome, [just as with Process X] [just
as if one were acting without information]. The second two plans allow you to
specify actions to be taken contingent on the realized outcome. Plan 3 specifies
that Action 1 be taken when Outcome 1 occurs and Action 2 be taken when
Outcome 2 occiirs. Plan 4 specifies that Action 2 be taken when Outcome 1 occurs
and Action 1 be taken when Outcome 2 occurs.
At the time Manager B chooses his action, [he will know which process you
have chosen], [he will know whether you have chosen to act with or without
information], but will not know your production action or plan choice or which
outcome has occurred. Note that Manager B is always restricted to the choice of a
single action regardless of whether you choose [Process X or Process Y] [to act
with or without information].
[Process Y] [Information on the random outcome] will have [an additional
fixed cost] [a cost] associated with it in certain periods of the experiment, and [not
have this additional cost] [be costless] in others. [When there is an additional cost]
[When information has a cost and you decide to use it], its cost will be subtracted
from the gross payoff for the trial. The [amount of additional cost] [cost of
information] is displayed next to the heading ["PROCESS Y"] ["WITH
INFORMATION"] on the computer display. This amount has been subtracted
from your expected payoff amounts in the [PROCESS Y] [WITH IISTFORMATION]
section.
. .
. . .In summary, you must make two decisions during each period: (1)
[which production process is to be used] [whether you wish to act with or without
information on the random outcome] and (2) which production action or plan you
wish to carry out. Manager B must choose a production action. Manager B
knows all the data regarding payoffs and outcome probabilities displayed on the
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computer screen at the beginning of each period (i.e., the data currently displayed
on the screen). At the time Manager B makes his choice, he will know [your
process choice] [whether or not you are acting with information]. But, he will not
know your production action or plan. At the end of each period, both you and
Manager B will be presented with the following data: (1) the outcome which
occurred, (2) the actions taken by both of you, and (3) the payoffs earned by both of
you.
Your payoffs and the [additional fixed cost for Process Y] [cost of
information] will generally remain the same from period to period. They will
change occasionally, however. The computer will give you a message when the
payoffs and/or costs do change. . .
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APPENDIXB
Computation ofInformation Value in tiie Experiment
The experimental setting can be characterized as a g£ane of imperfect , but
complete information with an uncertain parameter. Imperfect information
indicates the players are unable to observe each others' action choices. Complete
information indicates the players are aware of all the rules of the game, including
each others' payoffs and preferences [Schotter and Schwodiauer, 1980]. The game
can also be thought of as a reformulation of a game of incomplete information,
which is a game characterized by uncertainty about one or more game
parameters [Harsanyi, 1967, 1968].
In the following discussion. Action 1 is denoted a^ for Manager A and b^ for
Manager B; Action 2 is denoted a2 for Manager A and b2 for Manager B. The two
possible states of nature are denoted si and S2. Figure A2 shows the extensive
form of the game facing the two managers, based on the parameters in Figure
Al. The game can be decomposed into two subgames . labelled "informed" and
"not informed" in Figure A2. Manager A's decision problem on his first move is
to determine which of the two subgames will yield him a higher payoff.
Insert Figure Al and A2 about here. |
The game can be more easily analyzed by examination of its strategic form
(See Figure A3.). Examination of the no information subgame shows that ai is a
dominant strategy for Manager A, since 50 > 25 and 36 > -50. A similar analysis
shows that bi is a dominant strategy for Manager B. The strategy pair (a^, bi) is
thus a Nash equilibrium (NE); that is, a pair of strategies such that no player,
assuming the other is committed to his strategy, can increase his payoff by
imilaterally changing strategies [Shubik, 1982, p.240].
I Insert Figure A3 about here.
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The strategic form of the private information subgame shows that Manager
A has a choice of one of four decision rules . For a decision rule a^, the subscript i
indicates Player I's actions when si occurs; j indicates his actions when S2
occurs. For example, ai2 means "choose aj when s^ occurs; choose a2 when S2
occurs". The decision rule ai2 dominates all of Manager A's other decision rules.
Manager B still must choose between one of two actions as in the no information
case. Manager B's best response to ai2 is b2, which makes (ai2» b2) a NE.
The expected value of private information to an individual is his expected
payoff in the private information case, minus his expected payoff in the no
information case. In the present example, the value of private information to the
informed manager is 40 - 50, or -10. Information also has zero value to the
uninformed manager here. The negative value of private information for the
informed manager is in contrast to a single-person or decision-theoretic setting
where the Fineness Corollary of Blackwell's Theorem states that the value of a
finer information system is always greater than or equal to that of a coarser one.
This analysis presumes that the game is only played once. In the
experiment, the game was played repeatedly over multiple trials. The outcome of
a repeated game may differ from that of a single play game under certain
circumstances [Luce and Raiffa, 1957]. Specifically, if the NE point in single plays
is not Pareto-optimal, the players can achieve gains through cooperation in
repeated plays. However, the games used in the experiment were designed so
that the single-play optimal solutions were also optimal for both players in
repeated plays.
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Footnotes
lYet another possibility is the allocation of data processing costs from a
service department to individual units. For discussions of the optimal allocation
of such costs, see, for example, Zimmerman [1979] and Demski [1980].
2For nonlinear utility functions, the expected value of information would
differ. However, for nearly all types of utility functions, perfect information
should be preferred to no information. The only exception is that extreme risk
preferrers may prefer to act without information in Problem B.
3See Waller and Mitchell [1983] for an investigation of the relationship
between task demand and qualitative aspects of accounting information systems.
^Note that a choice task was used here, rather than the rating task
commonly used in existing subjective information evaluation research. This was
done in order to investigate the hypothesized task effects of information system
cost presentation discussed above.
^Note that this example is included for illustrative purposes only. The
setting presented to subjects was an abstract one, in order to avoid introducing
factors which might confound the hypothesis tests [Swieringa and Weick, 1982].
^The payoffs for the experiment were determined without regard to whether
they represented optimal contracting arrangements for the managers. While this
limits the external validity of the experiment in some respects, it does not affect
the principal objectives of the study, which are to determine the effects of task and
context variables on subjects' information system evaluations.
^The payoffs for the case with EV of -10 and zero COST are shown in
Appendix A (See Figures Al and A3). Other levels of EV were obtained by
changing Manager A's payoff for the outcome (a2, b2) in State 2. For positive
COST cases, 10 units were subtracted from all of Manager A's payoffs in the
private information subgame.
^The term CONTEXT will be used in the remainder of the paper to refer to
both the settings with uncertainty and that without. There is no "expected value"
of information in the basic game setting, since it is played under conditions of
certainty. However, for ease of exposition, the term EV will be used to indicate the
difference between payoffs at the Nash equilibrium points in the subgames
corresponding to private information and no information in the basic game
setting. Also, these subgames will be referred to as "private information" and "no
information", even in the basic game setting.
^A proof is available from the author.
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The subjects always chose actions in the basic game setting and when
they were acting without information in the other settings. When they chose to
act with information in the settings with state uncertainty, they were told to
choose a production plan , which is the same as the decision rules discussed in
Appendix A.
The rsindom nimibers ranged from 1 to 100. Random numbers from 1 to
60 indicated the occurrence of State 1, while numbers from 61 to 100 indicated
State 2 had occurred.
12Additionally, the top and second place subjects in each CONTEXT
treatment group were awarded prizes of $100 £ind $25.
l^Proofs are available from the author.
I'^The proportions were transformed before analysis using an arcsin
transformation (Neter and Wasserman, 1974, p.507) in order to avoid the problem
of unequal variances across different levels of the dependent variable.
l^The data meet the compound symmetry assumptions required for a
univariate repeated measures ANOVA, however, the multivariate approach was
used here to facilitate tests of the interaction hypotheses. With repeated measures
MANOVA, the set of orthogonal contrasts on EV is treated as a vector of
dependent variables. For each effect involving EV which MANOVA indicates to
be significant, separate ANOVAs are done on each individual contrast [Bock,
1975, Ch. 7; La Tour and Miniard, 1983]. The multivariate approach is generally
less powerful than the univariate. As a check, univariate tests were run on the
data. No differences were found between the two approaches as to the
significance of main effects or interactions .
l^The classifications for each level of cost were defined according to private
information subgame choice proportions as follows: payoff maximization—0.2 or
0.0 on the negative EV case, 0.8 or 1.0 on the positive EV case, and any proportion
on the zero EV case; always preferring information~0.8 or 1.0 on all cases. No
meaningful subclassifications could be drawn within the "other" category, except
for three subjects who consistently acted without information.
I'^The differences across contexts in relative proportions of choice patterns
are statistically significant for both zero stated cost {x^(4) = 8.75; p = 0.07) and
positive stated cost {x^(4) = 29.78; p < 0.0001).
l^Connolly and Serre [1984] found a similar result, where a significant
proportion of subjects presented with decision cues with equal validity but
different costs actually chose the cues with the higher cost.
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Table 1
Proportion ofChoices-Private Information Subgame
Breakdownl^ Cells
Zero Cost
Older Context Negative EV Zero EV Positive EV
Zero Basic Game 0.54 0.80 1.00
Cost Process Choice 0.50 0.88 0.94
First Info. Evaluation 0.80 0.94 0.88
Mean 0.61 0.87 0.94
Positive Basic Game 0.14 0.72 1.00
Cost Process Choice 0.58 0.82 0.70
First Info. Evaluation 0.58 0.76 0.86
Mean 0.43 0.77 0.85
Mean Basic Game 0.34 0.76 1.00
Values Process Choice 0.54 0.85 0.82
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.69 0.85 0.87
Overall Mean 0.52 0.82 0.90
Positive Cost
Order Context Neg^ative EV Zero EV Positive EV
Zero Basic Game 0.08 0.78 0.94
Cost Process Choice 0.78 0.68 0.80
First Info. Evaluation 0.46 0.66 0.74
Mean 0.44 0.71 0.83
Positive Basic Game 0.32 0.78 0.98
Cost Process Choice 0.66 0.76 0.70
First Info. Evaluation 0.52 0.58 0.76
Mean 0.50 0.71 0.81
Mean Basic Game 0.20 0.78 0.96
Values Process Choice 0.72 0.72 0.75
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.49 0.62 0.75
Overall Mean 0.47 0.71 0.82
(Table continues.)
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Table 1, continued
Averaged Across EV and COST
Means across EV levels
Order Context Negrative EV Zero EV Positive EV
Zero Basic Game 0.31 0.79 0.97
Cost Process Choice 0.64 0.78 0.87
First Info. Evaluation 0.63 0.80 0.81
Mean 0.53 0.79 0,88
Positive Basic Game 0.23 0.75 0.99
Cost Process Choice 0.62 0.79 0.70
First Info. Evaluation 0.55 0.67 0.81
Mean 0.47 0.74 0.83
Mean Basic Game 0.27 0.77 0.98
Values Process Choice 0.63 0.79 0.79
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.59 0.74 0.81
Overall Mean 0.50 0.76 0.86
Means across COST levels
Order Context Zero Cost Pos. Cost
Zero Basic Game 0.78 0.60
Cost Process Choice 0.77 0.75
First Info. Evaluation 0.87 0.62
Mean 0.81 0.66
Positive Basic Game 0.62 0.69
Cost Process Choice 0.70 0.71
First Info. Evaluation 0.73 0.62
Mean 0.68 0.67
Mean Basic Game 0.70 0.65
Values Process Choice 0.74 0.73
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.80 0.62
OverallMean 0.75 0.67
Averaged Across All Cases
Mean Choice
Order Context ProDortion
Zero Basic Game 0.69
Cost Process Choice 0.76
First Info. Evsduation
Mean
0.75
0.73
Positive Basic Game 0.66
Cost Process Choice 0.70
First Info. Evaluation
Mean
0.68
0.68
Mean Basic Game 0.67
Values Process Choice 0.73
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.71
OverallMean 0.71
\
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Table 2
Multivariate Analysis ofVariance ofProportions
ofPrivate Information Subgame Choices
Wilks
Source of Variation Lambda
CONTEXT
ORDER
ORDER X CONTEXT
COST
CONTEXT X COST
ORDER X COST
CONTEXT X ORDER x COST
EV 0.33
EV(1)
EV(2)
CONTEXT X EV 0.50
Context xEV(l)
Context X EV(2)
ORDER X EV 1.00
Order xEV(l)
Order x EV(2)
CONTEXT X ORDER x EV 0.92
Context X Order x EV(1)
Context X Order x EV(2)
COST X EV 0.98
Cost X EV(1)
Cost X EV(2)
CONTEXT X COST x EV 0.82
Context X Cost xEV(l)
Context X Cost x EV(2)
ORDER X COST x EV 0.95
Order X Cost xEV(l)
Order x Cost x EV(2)
ORDER X CONTEXT x COST x EV 0.82
Order x Context x Cost x EV(1)
Order x Context x Cost x EV(2)
0.20 0.817
0.80 0.375
0.05 0.943
9.06 0.004
2.95 0.061
5.23 0.026
1.34 0.270
53.05 0.000
106.46 0.000
6.40 0.014
10.97 0.000
26.40 0.000
1.11 0.337
0.02 0.982
0.03 0.866
0.01 0.942
1.16 0.332
1.19 0.312
0.94 0.397
0.50 0.611
0.25 0.619
0.96 0.332
2.74 0.033
3.66 0.032
3.26 0.046
1.31 0.277
2.67 0.108
0.29 0.595
2.86 0.027
5.53 0.007
1.90 0.160
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Tables
Analysis ofPredicted Interaction Contrasts
Contrast t E
Hi: (azero COST " flpos. COST ) ^0^ each context
Context (1) 1.25 0.518
Context (2) 0.32 0.985
Context (3) 3.65 0.003
H2A and H2b: Comparison of EV(1) contrasts across contexts
Context (D- Context (2) 6.53 0.000
Context (D- Context (3) 6.03 0.000
Context (2) - Context (3) -0.50 0.999
H3A and Hsb:
Comparison of sUieg. EV across contexts
Context (2) - Context ( 1) 5.57 0.000
Context (3)- Context (1) 5.18 0.000
Comparison of iipos. EV across contexts
Context (2)- Context (1) -3.25 0.014
Context (3) - Context ( 1) -2.97 0.028
H5A and H5B: COST x EV(1) contrasts for each context
Context (1) 0.97 0.705
Context (2) -2.49 0.047
Context (3) 0.65 0.889
HeA and Rqb' COST x EV(2) contrasts for each context
Context (1) 1.36 0.449
Context (2) -2.22 0.087
Context (3) -0.83 0.795
Context (1): Basic Game Setting
Context (2): Process Choice Setting
Context (3): Information Evaluation Setting
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Tab]e4
Tabulation ofSutrject Choice Patterns byCONTEXT and COST
Basic Process Information
Game Choice Evaluation
Setting Settingr Setting Totals
Zero Stated Cost
Payoff Maximizing 10 5 4 19
Always Preferring
Pvt. Info. Subgame 2 8 10 20
Other 8 7 6 21
Positive Stated Cost
Payoff Maximizing 15 1 3 19
Always Preferring
Pvt. Info. Subgame 1 12 7 20
Other 4 7 10 21
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Schematic Diagram ofElxperiment
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Game Parameters
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Extensive Form of the Game
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